CVE-2022-29951

CVE-2022-29951

JTEKT TOYOPUC PLCs through 2022-04-29 mishandle authentication. They utilize the CMPLink/TCP protocol (configurable on ports 1024-65534 on either TCP or UDP) for a wide variety of engineering purposes such as starting and stopping the PLC, downloading and uploading projects, and changing configuration settings. This protocol does not have any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the port in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.

Source: CVE-2022-29951

CVE-2022-29952

CVE-2022-29952

Bently Nevada condition monitoring equipment through 2022-04-29 mishandles authentication. It utilizes the TDI command and data protocols (60005/TCP, 60007/TCP) for communications between the monitoring controller and System 1 and/or Bently Nevada Monitor Configuration (BNMC) software. These protocols provide configuration management and historical data related functionality. Neither protocol has any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the ports in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.

Source: CVE-2022-29952

CVE-2022-29957

CVE-2022-29957

The Emerson DeltaV Distributed Control System (DCS) through 2022-04-29 mishandles authentication. It utilizes several proprietary protocols for a wide variety of functionality. These protocols include Firmware upgrade (18508/TCP, 18518/TCP); Plug-and-Play (18510/UDP); Hawk services (18507/UDP); Management (18519/TCP); Cold restart (18512/UDP); SIS communications (12345/TCP); and Wireless Gateway Protocol (18515/UDP). None of these protocols have any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the ports in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.

Source: CVE-2022-29957

CVE-2022-29958

CVE-2022-29958

JTEKT TOYOPUC PLCs through 2022-04-29 do not ensure data integrity. They utilize the unauthenticated CMPLink/TCP protocol for engineering purposes, including downloading projects and control logic to the PLC. Control logic is downloaded to the PLC on a block-by-block basis with a given memory address and a blob of machine code. The logic that is downloaded to the PLC is not cryptographically authenticated, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary machine code on the PLC’s CPU module in the context of the runtime. In the case of the PC10G-CPU, and likely for other CPU modules of the TOYOPUC family, a processor without MPU or MMU is used and this no memory protection or privilege-separation capabilities are available, giving an attacker full control over the CPU.

Source: CVE-2022-29958