This library allows strings to be parsed as functions and stored as a specialized component, [`JsonFunctionValue`]( To do this, Javascript’s [`eval`]( function is used to execute strings that begin with "function" as Javascript. This unfortunately could allow arbitrary code to be executed if it exists as a value within the JSON structure being displayed. Given that this component may often be used to display data from arbitrary, untrusted sources, this is extremely dangerous. One important note is that users who have defined a custom [`onSubmitValueParser`]( callback prop on the [`JsonTree`]( component should be ***unaffected***. This vulnerability exists in the default `onSubmitValueParser` prop which calls [`parse`]( Prop is added to `JsonTree` called `allowFunctionEvaluation`. This prop will be set to `true` in v2.2.2, which allows upgrade without losing backwards-compatibility. In v2.2.2, we switched from using `eval` to using [`Function`]( to construct anonymous functions. This is better than `eval` for the following reasons: – Arbitrary code should not be able to execute immediately, since the `Function` constructor explicitly *only creates* anonymous functions – Functions are created without local closures, so they only have access to the global scope If you use: – **Version `<2.2.2`**, you must upgrade as soon as possible. – **Version `^2.2.2`**, you must explicitly set `JsonTree`’s `allowFunctionEvaluation` prop to `false` to fully mitigate this vulnerability. – **Version `>=3.0.0`**, `allowFunctionEvaluation` is already set to `false` by default, so no further steps are necessary.

Source: CVE-2022-36010

답글 남기기

이메일 주소는 공개되지 않습니다. 필수 항목은 *(으)로 표시합니다

Time limit is exhausted. Please reload the CAPTCHA.