On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of
If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open
port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login.
An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without
triggering the â€œmeasured bootâ€� mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking
the device as â€œUUDâ€� (â€œUnknown Update Detectedâ€�).
This is because the â€œ/configâ€� partition is not protected by â€œmeasured bootâ€�, it is mutable, and
it is not encrypted in any way.
An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not
triggering the â€œmeasured bootâ€� mechanism, and having full access to the vault.
This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config
partition measurement was added to PCR13:
This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.